What most advocates of ground troops in Syria conveniently forget to mention is what is to be done áfter Daesh is militarily defeated.
They keep coming up with Petraeus' Surge. And yes, the surge did defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq. But only temporarily. They came back with a vengeance and renamed themselves, in the end, to Islamic State.
The reason they give for it is that Obama retreated the troops. But one should not forget the American people were pretty fed up with the war at that point in 2009 and the Iraqi's preferred to see them go too, prompted by the Iranians. (Not to mention Bush signed the SOF agreement to retreat the troops)
Defeating Daesh militarily is the fairly easy part. Just bring in a lot of troops, Surge style, and you could do it. In that sense the likes of Max Boot and Michael Doran are right. But what they neglect to mention is what is to be done afterwards.
Sunni's in Iraq will not trust the Baghdad government in the foreseeable future and the Shiite dominated government is not one for power sharing. Not with the Kurds and certainly not with the Sunni's who have suppressed them in the Saddam years.
In Syria there is not even a beginning of a solution. Even if the Alawite regime, with or without Assad, could come to some sort of agreement with the rebels, the rebels themselves are very fragmented. And even on the regime side groups like the Druze are increasingly disgruntled. Imposing democracy on a heavily armed and very divided country is not very likely going to result in a stable government.
And in the current fast media culture Western countries are not for staying in a situation for the long haul. And even if we do, like the 14 years we have been in Afghanistan, the results are less than convincing.
And then there is the effect Western troops have when they are deployed in the region. They work as a jihadi magnet. Al Qaeda was founded by Bin Laden as an reaction to US deployment in Saudi-Arabia in 1990/91.
What you would need is a local solution with local Sunni forces so the population would have a decent alternative to Daesh or other jihadist. The problem is which Sunni power would be able or willing? Turkey is more interested in fighting Kurds, The Saudi's are more interested in fighting Iran. Not to mention the fact that any regional power moving in will immediately face opposition from the others.
What is needed is a sort of agreement between the regional powers Saudi-Arabia, Turkey and Iran. But that's a long way off but the very first small step has been made in Vienna: Iran and Saudi's sitting at one table and talking.
Regarding IS the only thing you can do now is contain them for the time being and that is going better than expected. One could argue that IS spreading out to Europe is a sign of that. Last year they weren't interested in exporting terrorism. They were expanding their caliphate. Now that expansion has been checked they fall back on old Al-Qaeda tactics: international terrorism. Quite a shift in strategy.
There won't be any quick fixes for the current terrorism wave. European terrorism doesn't even come from Syria although Hollande likes to make us believe that. It is home grown. They are EU nationals, born and bred. Radicalized in Europe. But that is a message that is too inconvenient for most.
dinsdag 17 november 2015
zondag 8 november 2015
The power of perception
For a week now the Metrojet crash in the Sinai has been subject to speculation. Was it IS in Sinai with a manpad? (No, too high) Was it technical failure? That was the consensus and when Metrojet themselves discounted that it was disregarded at first but when more signals started coming in about a possible bomb on board it rapidly gained ground. Now even the Russians and Egyptians seem to think it was a bomb. Giving the Egyptian government awkward questions to answer about airport security.
Not very surprising when you know that worker jobs in Egypt are badly underpaid. Relying in cases, where possible, on bakshish (tipping). So where bakshish does not applies people will get inventive. I remember from personal experience that tourist police would gladly chip parts from archeologic sites for you if you would pay them a small fee when their job was to stop you from doing things like that. Currently stories surface that security staff would let suitcases full of drugs or weapons pass for 10 euro's. It did not surprise me at all. But all this on a side note.
One thing nobody questioned was who was the target. It was clear for everyone that Russia was targeted for getting involved in Syria. Even though Russia hardly bombed IS at all, instead hitting mainly Nusra, FSA and other rebel groups. It had bothered me a bit this week.
Today, on BBC Sunday Politics, Dr Domitilla Sagramoso said exactly that: Russia was probably not the premier target. Egypt was.
Don't overestimate the operational and organizational qualities of a group like IS. It's not SPECTRE. Most of these affiliates operate completely independent and are only in name a branch of IS. The Sinai group is probably not even very interested in what Putin is up to in Syria. They where just trying to hit Egypt where it hurts: Tourism. Bombing a Russian plane then makes sense in that you are hitting the group that was still going to Egypt in larges numbers after tourism from other countries dropped dramatically after 2011.
Groups with a regional or local agenda like IS in Sinai generally do not act in big geo strategic ways. It reminded me of what I was told when I was in Kandahar in 2008. We got our little security speech about what to do in case of an 'incoming'. Taliban shot old Russian ordnance towards the KAF base from a stack of stones. Not very accurate, a lot of them were duds, but every now and then something would hit. Statistics showed that they aimed at the airfield and at the planes and drones parked there. Not at the base where 15.000 troops where stationed. This is a very tactical approach. Hitting the planes that attack you. If you think a little bit bigger, more in geo strategy terms, you'd better try to hit one of the three 'restaurants' on the base during lunch or dinner time. Trying to kill as much soldiers in one attack as you can. Home fronts don't like it when body bags come home in large numbers. These kind of counter insurgency fights are often lost in the media and public perception. Anyway, it showed to me the Taliban where fairly 'provincial' in their approach.
For that reason I currently doubt whether this attack, if it was one of course, was directed from Raqqa Central with the intend of hitting Russia. Of course it could turn out that that was in fact the case. It could also have been a case of opportunity, a coincidence the bomb ended up in a Russian plane. But it was probably aimed at the Egyptian tourism industry.
In the aftermath it doesn't really matter. Perception is sometimes more relevant than fact. Russia will react like it was aimed at them. The reaction will not be a retreat from Syria. The big question is for who exactly that is bad news.
Not very surprising when you know that worker jobs in Egypt are badly underpaid. Relying in cases, where possible, on bakshish (tipping). So where bakshish does not applies people will get inventive. I remember from personal experience that tourist police would gladly chip parts from archeologic sites for you if you would pay them a small fee when their job was to stop you from doing things like that. Currently stories surface that security staff would let suitcases full of drugs or weapons pass for 10 euro's. It did not surprise me at all. But all this on a side note.
One thing nobody questioned was who was the target. It was clear for everyone that Russia was targeted for getting involved in Syria. Even though Russia hardly bombed IS at all, instead hitting mainly Nusra, FSA and other rebel groups. It had bothered me a bit this week.
Today, on BBC Sunday Politics, Dr Domitilla Sagramoso said exactly that: Russia was probably not the premier target. Egypt was.
Don't overestimate the operational and organizational qualities of a group like IS. It's not SPECTRE. Most of these affiliates operate completely independent and are only in name a branch of IS. The Sinai group is probably not even very interested in what Putin is up to in Syria. They where just trying to hit Egypt where it hurts: Tourism. Bombing a Russian plane then makes sense in that you are hitting the group that was still going to Egypt in larges numbers after tourism from other countries dropped dramatically after 2011.
Groups with a regional or local agenda like IS in Sinai generally do not act in big geo strategic ways. It reminded me of what I was told when I was in Kandahar in 2008. We got our little security speech about what to do in case of an 'incoming'. Taliban shot old Russian ordnance towards the KAF base from a stack of stones. Not very accurate, a lot of them were duds, but every now and then something would hit. Statistics showed that they aimed at the airfield and at the planes and drones parked there. Not at the base where 15.000 troops where stationed. This is a very tactical approach. Hitting the planes that attack you. If you think a little bit bigger, more in geo strategy terms, you'd better try to hit one of the three 'restaurants' on the base during lunch or dinner time. Trying to kill as much soldiers in one attack as you can. Home fronts don't like it when body bags come home in large numbers. These kind of counter insurgency fights are often lost in the media and public perception. Anyway, it showed to me the Taliban where fairly 'provincial' in their approach.
For that reason I currently doubt whether this attack, if it was one of course, was directed from Raqqa Central with the intend of hitting Russia. Of course it could turn out that that was in fact the case. It could also have been a case of opportunity, a coincidence the bomb ended up in a Russian plane. But it was probably aimed at the Egyptian tourism industry.
In the aftermath it doesn't really matter. Perception is sometimes more relevant than fact. Russia will react like it was aimed at them. The reaction will not be a retreat from Syria. The big question is for who exactly that is bad news.
vrijdag 6 november 2015
Putin's dilemma
I said a month ago that what I perceived to be Putin's plan for Syria would inevitably would go wrong.
In warfare things always go wrong at a certain point. It is not a proces you can completely control. The more complex, the less control and I think we can agree that the Syria situation is one in the range of highest complexity.
For a month now I couldn't understand why people were applauding Putin's action and criticizing Obama's inaction. For me the inevitability of failure was so obvious it was only a matter of time before it would show.
I think we reached this point now.
South of Aleppo the Iranians gained some ground but for the rest the offensive bogged down pretty quickly and was even reversed in some places. Substantial losses in manpower and vehicles.
-I just learned Russian planes killed 16 Hezbollah fighters today in a friendly fire incident.
If the Metrojet crash in Sinai is indeed the work of IS it would be an enormous drawback. It would force Putin to respond. Probably by committing more forces and that would drag Russia further in the quagmire that is Syria.
This dilemma is probably the reason why they are not jumping to conclusions to the cause of the crash. Maybe they will even deny it was an IS bomb.
I get the impression Obama understands very well Syria is something you don't want to get too involved in. And why would the US? What is there to gain? What is the US strategic interest in Syria? It's just about containing IS and, for now, there is no reason to involve western ground troops to achieve that.
Like Jeremy Shapiro from Brookings said last month in a VOX article:
"The Russian intervention is so incredibly stupid that it took the US by surprise that Putin would actually do it."
and:
"When your enemy is making a mistake, do not interrupt him."
We'll just have to wait and see how this works out. Inaction is not necessarily always a bad thing.
In warfare things always go wrong at a certain point. It is not a proces you can completely control. The more complex, the less control and I think we can agree that the Syria situation is one in the range of highest complexity.
For a month now I couldn't understand why people were applauding Putin's action and criticizing Obama's inaction. For me the inevitability of failure was so obvious it was only a matter of time before it would show.
I think we reached this point now.
South of Aleppo the Iranians gained some ground but for the rest the offensive bogged down pretty quickly and was even reversed in some places. Substantial losses in manpower and vehicles.
-I just learned Russian planes killed 16 Hezbollah fighters today in a friendly fire incident.
If the Metrojet crash in Sinai is indeed the work of IS it would be an enormous drawback. It would force Putin to respond. Probably by committing more forces and that would drag Russia further in the quagmire that is Syria.
This dilemma is probably the reason why they are not jumping to conclusions to the cause of the crash. Maybe they will even deny it was an IS bomb.
I get the impression Obama understands very well Syria is something you don't want to get too involved in. And why would the US? What is there to gain? What is the US strategic interest in Syria? It's just about containing IS and, for now, there is no reason to involve western ground troops to achieve that.
Like Jeremy Shapiro from Brookings said last month in a VOX article:
"The Russian intervention is so incredibly stupid that it took the US by surprise that Putin would actually do it."
and:
"When your enemy is making a mistake, do not interrupt him."
We'll just have to wait and see how this works out. Inaction is not necessarily always a bad thing.
zondag 4 oktober 2015
Putin's endgame in Syria
After a few days of attacks by the Russians in Syria we can conclude that IS is not really the target. Instead it is mainly the US backed moderate groups and Jaish al-Fateh/Nusra who are targeted.
What could be Putin's plan.
We've heard a lot of motives for Putin to get into Syria: Draw attention away from Ukraine because that conflict is going nowhere, wanting a central position on the world stage, annoying the West and U.S. in particular, save his old ally Assad, save his mediterranean navy base, creating a negotiation position to keep the Crimea and/or get rid of the sanctions, strengthening his position in the Middle-East or even maybe become the Great Peacemaker.
All are probably true, or partially, or to a certain degree. What you want to do then is come up with a sort of endgame for Syria. The only viable endgame is a political solution where the regime (with or without Assad) negotiate a peace with the rebels (with or without Nusra)
Note that IS is not a party in these negotiations. They shouldn't be. For Putin they're not even that relevant as long as IS leaves the regime relatively alone, as they have done the last two years.
Putin wants to negotiate from a position of strength of course. When you start to talk to the rebels you want to do that from the position where the rebels feel they can't win militarily, when the regime is winning. Or at least the perception is that they're winning. Currently that's not the case.
But as we have seen momentum has changed sides several times in this war. First the rebels seemed to be winning, until the Iranians brought in Hezbollah. The tide seemed to be changing again when ISIS entered from Iraq in 2013 but they and the other rebels turned on each other. During 2014 it stayed relatively stable until the cooperation between Turkey, Qatar and Saudi-Arabia supporting the rebels started. The rebel coalition Jaish al-Fateh managed to make big gains this year in Idlib province which prompted the Iranians to ask Russia for help since Assad's forces are really short on manpower, Hezbollah had been severely battered, Iran doesn't really want to commit their own troops and Shia militias from Iraq and Afghanistan can't make the difference either.
It all comes down to get the timing right to start negotiations. Time is not on Putin's side. He cannot afford a prolonged war. Not financially and not at home. So if he can have a short offensive pummeling the rebels, getting rid of pockets like the one north of Homs and take back some parts of Idlib and the perception is they could go all the way to Aleppo and the Turkish border. Putin, at that point, might be 'convinced' by the West to have Assad negotiate with the rebels. Right now the rebels are in no way ready to talk to Assad but if you're losing you don't have much choice. That could result in a sort of deal for western Syria. The Caliphate will have to wait.
Then Putin is the great peacemaker, we forget about the Crimea, he may even quietly pull the plug on the rebels in Donbass, the sanctions are lifted and the West gets to continue the endless war on IS. Win-win for Putin.
But as the old Moltke adagium goes: No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy. So a lot can go wrong along the way and it will be interesting to see how Putin will deal with the inevitable failures. Will he be sucked into the quagmire? Will he give up and leave or wil his intervention just peter out.
What could be Putin's plan.
We've heard a lot of motives for Putin to get into Syria: Draw attention away from Ukraine because that conflict is going nowhere, wanting a central position on the world stage, annoying the West and U.S. in particular, save his old ally Assad, save his mediterranean navy base, creating a negotiation position to keep the Crimea and/or get rid of the sanctions, strengthening his position in the Middle-East or even maybe become the Great Peacemaker.
All are probably true, or partially, or to a certain degree. What you want to do then is come up with a sort of endgame for Syria. The only viable endgame is a political solution where the regime (with or without Assad) negotiate a peace with the rebels (with or without Nusra)
Note that IS is not a party in these negotiations. They shouldn't be. For Putin they're not even that relevant as long as IS leaves the regime relatively alone, as they have done the last two years.
Putin wants to negotiate from a position of strength of course. When you start to talk to the rebels you want to do that from the position where the rebels feel they can't win militarily, when the regime is winning. Or at least the perception is that they're winning. Currently that's not the case.
But as we have seen momentum has changed sides several times in this war. First the rebels seemed to be winning, until the Iranians brought in Hezbollah. The tide seemed to be changing again when ISIS entered from Iraq in 2013 but they and the other rebels turned on each other. During 2014 it stayed relatively stable until the cooperation between Turkey, Qatar and Saudi-Arabia supporting the rebels started. The rebel coalition Jaish al-Fateh managed to make big gains this year in Idlib province which prompted the Iranians to ask Russia for help since Assad's forces are really short on manpower, Hezbollah had been severely battered, Iran doesn't really want to commit their own troops and Shia militias from Iraq and Afghanistan can't make the difference either.
It all comes down to get the timing right to start negotiations. Time is not on Putin's side. He cannot afford a prolonged war. Not financially and not at home. So if he can have a short offensive pummeling the rebels, getting rid of pockets like the one north of Homs and take back some parts of Idlib and the perception is they could go all the way to Aleppo and the Turkish border. Putin, at that point, might be 'convinced' by the West to have Assad negotiate with the rebels. Right now the rebels are in no way ready to talk to Assad but if you're losing you don't have much choice. That could result in a sort of deal for western Syria. The Caliphate will have to wait.
Then Putin is the great peacemaker, we forget about the Crimea, he may even quietly pull the plug on the rebels in Donbass, the sanctions are lifted and the West gets to continue the endless war on IS. Win-win for Putin.
But as the old Moltke adagium goes: No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy. So a lot can go wrong along the way and it will be interesting to see how Putin will deal with the inevitable failures. Will he be sucked into the quagmire? Will he give up and leave or wil his intervention just peter out.
zaterdag 26 september 2015
Russian intervention in Syria
When the Russians started moving equipment to Syria my first instinct was that they were going to help Assad survive. Claiming to 'fight terrorism' they would just be pulling an 'Erdogan.' Nusra an Ahrar al-Sham would be the targets.
No way were they going to attack IS.
But now I start to wonder if Putin has a grander plan.
What I would like to know first is whose initiative this Russian intervention was.
Putin's initiative? Worried about his embattled ally, or about his mediterranean navy base? Looking for a bigger strategic involvement in the Middle East? Worried about losing influence over Assad to the Iranians?
Iran's initiative? Running out of options to save Assad's regime. Asked the Russians to pitch in.
According to the Financial Times Tehran was 'surprised' by the Russian intervention but its story is based on a unnamed source and since a lot of the Russian equipment used Iranian airspace to go to Syria I don't think we should take it too seriously.
Assad's initiative? Worried, like Abadi in Iraq, about growing Iranian influence over his regime. Iranians building a parallel power structure with militias like they did in Lebanon and Iraq. Invited the Russians as a counterweight for that.
I don't think we'll get an answer to that question any time soon. The only thing we can do is monitor every move for clues.
Russian troops are reportedly stationed no where near IS front lines. Having a lot of people concluding that IS is not the target. But that doesn't have to be the case. Ground troops are just a small contingent of the Russian force so far. Not enough to conduct any offensive. Russian action will come from the air component. Their position is irrelevant to where they will strike.
What I did see was Russian drone footage from Palmyra. Now this could be a case of maskirovka. Trying to fool us that IS is the target. I actually joked last week that Putin could pull a nice PR stunt if he would 'liberate' the antiquities of Palmyra. But it could also mean Putin actually wants to degrade IS, and maybe try to succeed where the U.S. have so far failed, to create a strong strategical and diplomatic position in the Middle East.
With IS out of the way Putin could offer a political solution for Syria without Assad since the West biggest fear has always been that toppling Assad would empower IS. Cease fires with the opposition are already being negotiated, like in Zabadani.
Rouhani has been hinting at a political solution, but only after the fighting stops. Big question is whether Syria is in Rouhani's jurisdiction. Up till now it has been Soleimani's domain, under direct guidance from Khamenei. Is Rouhani operating on his own, part of the internal Iranian struggle between moderates and hardliners? Or is Khamenei playing a good cop, bad cop game through Rouhani and Soleimani?
Another possible, but cynical, scenario is the one where the Russians destroy Nusra and the moderate opposition. Making the Syria conflict just one between Assad and IS. Forcing the rest of the world to support Assad.
The big if is whether a hand full of Russian planes could make such an impact. That remains very much to be seen.
No way were they going to attack IS.
But now I start to wonder if Putin has a grander plan.
What I would like to know first is whose initiative this Russian intervention was.
Putin's initiative? Worried about his embattled ally, or about his mediterranean navy base? Looking for a bigger strategic involvement in the Middle East? Worried about losing influence over Assad to the Iranians?
Iran's initiative? Running out of options to save Assad's regime. Asked the Russians to pitch in.
According to the Financial Times Tehran was 'surprised' by the Russian intervention but its story is based on a unnamed source and since a lot of the Russian equipment used Iranian airspace to go to Syria I don't think we should take it too seriously.
I don't think we'll get an answer to that question any time soon. The only thing we can do is monitor every move for clues.
Russian troops are reportedly stationed no where near IS front lines. Having a lot of people concluding that IS is not the target. But that doesn't have to be the case. Ground troops are just a small contingent of the Russian force so far. Not enough to conduct any offensive. Russian action will come from the air component. Their position is irrelevant to where they will strike.
What I did see was Russian drone footage from Palmyra. Now this could be a case of maskirovka. Trying to fool us that IS is the target. I actually joked last week that Putin could pull a nice PR stunt if he would 'liberate' the antiquities of Palmyra. But it could also mean Putin actually wants to degrade IS, and maybe try to succeed where the U.S. have so far failed, to create a strong strategical and diplomatic position in the Middle East.
With IS out of the way Putin could offer a political solution for Syria without Assad since the West biggest fear has always been that toppling Assad would empower IS. Cease fires with the opposition are already being negotiated, like in Zabadani.
Rouhani has been hinting at a political solution, but only after the fighting stops. Big question is whether Syria is in Rouhani's jurisdiction. Up till now it has been Soleimani's domain, under direct guidance from Khamenei. Is Rouhani operating on his own, part of the internal Iranian struggle between moderates and hardliners? Or is Khamenei playing a good cop, bad cop game through Rouhani and Soleimani?
Another possible, but cynical, scenario is the one where the Russians destroy Nusra and the moderate opposition. Making the Syria conflict just one between Assad and IS. Forcing the rest of the world to support Assad.
The big if is whether a hand full of Russian planes could make such an impact. That remains very much to be seen.
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