zondag 8 november 2015

The power of perception

For a week now the Metrojet crash in the Sinai has been subject to speculation. Was it IS in Sinai with a manpad? (No, too high) Was it technical failure? That was the consensus and when Metrojet themselves discounted that it was disregarded at first but when more signals started coming in about a possible bomb on board it rapidly gained ground. Now even the Russians and Egyptians seem to think it was a bomb. Giving the Egyptian government awkward questions to answer about airport security. 

Not very surprising when you know that worker jobs in Egypt are badly underpaid. Relying in cases, where possible, on bakshish (tipping). So where bakshish does not applies people will get inventive. I remember from personal experience that tourist police would gladly chip parts from archeologic sites for you if you would pay them a small fee when their job was to stop you from doing things like that. Currently stories surface that security staff would let suitcases full of drugs or weapons pass for 10 euro's. It did not surprise me at all. But all this on a side note.

One thing nobody questioned was who was the target. It was clear for everyone that Russia was targeted for getting involved in Syria. Even though Russia hardly bombed IS at all, instead hitting mainly Nusra, FSA and other rebel groups. It had bothered me a bit this week.

Today, on BBC Sunday Politics, Dr Domitilla Sagramoso said exactly that: Russia was probably not the premier target. Egypt was. 
Don't overestimate the operational and organizational qualities of a group like IS. It's not SPECTRE. Most of these affiliates operate completely independent and are only in name a branch of IS. The Sinai group is probably not even very interested in what Putin is up to in Syria. They where just trying to hit Egypt where it hurts: Tourism. Bombing a Russian plane then makes sense in that you are hitting the group that was still going to Egypt in larges numbers after tourism from other countries dropped dramatically after 2011.

Groups with a regional or local agenda like IS in Sinai generally do not act in big geo strategic ways. It reminded me of what I was told when I was in Kandahar in 2008. We got our little security speech about what to do in case of an 'incoming'. Taliban shot old Russian ordnance towards the KAF base from a stack of stones. Not very accurate, a lot of them were duds, but every now and then something would hit. Statistics showed that they aimed at the airfield and at the planes and drones parked there. Not at the base where 15.000 troops where stationed. This is a very tactical approach. Hitting the planes that attack you. If you think a little bit bigger, more in geo strategy terms, you'd better try to hit one of the three 'restaurants' on the base during lunch or dinner time. Trying to kill as much soldiers in one attack as you can. Home fronts don't like it when body bags come home in large numbers. These kind of counter insurgency fights are often lost in the media and public perception. Anyway, it showed to me the Taliban where fairly 'provincial' in their approach.

For that reason I currently doubt whether this attack, if it was one of course, was directed from Raqqa Central with the intend of hitting Russia. Of course it could turn out that that was in fact the case. It could also have been a case of opportunity, a coincidence the bomb ended up in a Russian plane. But it was probably aimed at the Egyptian tourism industry.

In the aftermath it doesn't really matter. Perception is sometimes more relevant than fact. Russia will react like it was aimed at them. The reaction will not be a retreat from Syria. The big question is for who exactly that is bad news.